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MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND FEDERAL TAXATION
RANDOLPH E. PAULt
ON August 12, 1937, President Roosevelt nominated Hugo Black, senior
Senator from Alabama, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to re-
place Justice Van Devanter, who had retired on June 2, 1937. It was Presi-
dent Roosevelt's first appointment to the Court. The nomination was confirmed
by the Senate on August 17, 1937. The nominee took his seat on October 4,
1937.1 Today, eighteen troubled years later, he sits on the right hand of a
younger Chief Justice. He is the only member of the 1937 Bench who is living
today.2
CIVIL WAR IN A HIGH PLACE
Justice Black came to the Supreme Court at a critical moment in the country's
history. It was also a period of crisis for the Supreme Court.3 On May 27,
1935, the Court had handed down the Schechter decision,4 invalidating the
tLate member of the District of Columbia, New Jersey and New York Bars.
1. 302 U.S. iiin.3 (1937).
2. Justice Reed, who sits on the left hand of the Chief Justice, was Solicitor General
during the 1937 term.
3. Cf. JAcKsoN, TEE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 124 (1941).
4. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). For a discussion of the Schechter
case, see CuRns, LioNs UNDER THE THRONE 113 (1947).
On February 6, 1956, not long after the completion of this article, Mr. Paul was
mortally strickn while he was testifying before the Joint Congressional Committee on
the Economic Report. The Journal joins, in mourning the loss, a multitude of Mr. Paul's
fritnds and admirers. One of these, Professor Fred Rodell, writes:
"Young men who come out of law school with their ideals still on high often seem
toi face a nasty dilemma. Should they fit their ideals to their future work and so lower
their integrity--or should they fit their work to their ideals and so lower their incomes?
I suggest that, instead of making either unpleasant choice, they give some thought to the
rare career of Randolph Paul.
"Randolph Paul was the ablest tax lawyer in the United States. No one knew so well
aj he all the ins and outs and arounds and beneaths of the Internal Revenue Code. This
knowledge he sold to men and companies, who stood in line to buy it. But outside of
court and office, he steadfastly refused-almost alone among top tax lawyers-to serve
as professicnal spokesman for his clients. Disturbed by the very gaps and inequities in
the Code that favored those who could afford his counsel, he fought without cease-as
writer, teacher and government advisor-for tax fairness and tax reform. It could truly
be said of him that he publicly tried to put himself privately out of business.
"Crusader that he was, there was none of the righteous air of the crusader about
Randolph. A warm and gentle and mellow man with a soft voice and smile, he won to
him a myriad of friends. His death is our deep loss, just as his life was a rich example
to us of decency in the practice of law."
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code-making provisions of Roosevelt's NIRA. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, had held that Congress could not, under the guise of
regulating interstate commerce, give to the President "virtually unfettered"
discretion to make whatever codes he thought necessary for the rehabilitation
of industry. Even Justice Cardozo, concurring, objected to delegation of legis-
lative power which he thought was "running riot." 5
Donald Richberg, Chairman of the NIRA Board, and Solicitor General
Reed, who had argued the Schechter case, were downcast. Others, including
Senators Borah of Idaho and King of Utah, were elated. A frustrated Presi-
dent did not conceal his disappointment. A few days after the Schchter de-
cision he shocked an eager press conference with a statement that the Court
had deprived the federal government of all control over economic and social
conditions by interpreting the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in the light
of the "horse-and-buggy" days of 1787 when it was written.0 To him the
Schechter "sick-chicken" case was the Supreme Court's most important-and
deplorable-ruling since the Dred Scott decision which precipitated the Civil
War.7
The AAA, another favorite piece of New Deal legislation, was soon to suffer
a similar fate. The constitutionality of this Act had been argued before the
Supreme Court in December 1935. An able advocate had stood before the
Court to plead in dramatic fashion the case of the America he loved, praying-
that the "land of the regimented" might not in his time be accepted as a worthy
substitute for "the land of the free." s On January 6, 1936, a bare majority of
the Court, still under the spell of Mr. Pepper's mystical eloquence, decided that
the AAA was unconstitutional. 9
The majority opinion may have been a "tortured construction of the Con-
stitution," as an outraged Justice Stone declared in a bitter dissent joined in
5. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra note 4, at 553.
6. Cf. Curtis' statement: "Time's chariot had forged ahead of the old judicial bus."
CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 83.
I select the Schechter case for specific comment because it precipitated this protest from
the President. There had been several storm signals. The Hot Oil case was one. Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Four Justices had dissented from the Court's
decision in the Gold Clause cases, handed down on February 18, 1935. Norman v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) ; Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935) ; Perry
v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). On May 6, 1935, the Supreme Court Iald the Rail-
road Retirement Act unconstitutional. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S.
330 (1935). On May 27, 1935, it struck down the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debtors' Relkf
Act. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). On the sam'
day the Court decided that the President was without inherent power to remove a Fcderal
Trade Commissioner. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
7. 2 PusEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 742 (1951).
8. JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131.
9. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also Anniston 'Mfg. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 337 (1937) ; Rickert Rice Mills Inc. v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936) ; cf. Mul-
ford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939). For a discussion of the Butler case, see CuITTS, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 121.
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by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo,1° but nonetheless it took away $500 million
of revenue from a budget otherwise in balance except for relief expenditures,
and precipitated a crisis for the revenue. A baffled Congress, whose power to
tax and spend no longer included the power "to relieve a nation-wide economic
maladjustment by conditional gifts of money,' had no recourse but to turn
to new sources of revenue. A little later the Court struck down the Bituminous
Coal Act.12 To put things crudely, the Court had reached a new high in "nui-
sance value"' 3 in obstructing the Administration's efforts to cope with the
economic and social conditions of the Depression.14
The President used harsh terms in the 1936 election campaign. He called
the reactionaries of the day, who sought through concentration of economic
power to control the lives of less fortunate persons and even to direct govern-
mental action, "economic royalists"-comparing them to the Royalists and
Tories of the eighteenth century who had tried in vain to prevent the nation's
attainment of political freedom. He added that intelligent conservatives had
long known that worthy institutions could be conserved only by adjusting them
to changing times. On February 5, 1937, soon after his landslide election vic-
tory, the President made his famous attempt to put new blood, new vigor, new
experience and new outlook into a Supreme Court that was hesitating between
two worlds.1  The Supreme Court packing bill never passed, but a marshalled
public opinion achieved at least part of the presidential objective. Certainly, it
10. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936). It has been asserted that the bitter
tone of this dissent almost lost the vote of Justice Brandeis. 2 PusEy, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES 745 (1951).
11. United States v. Butler, supra note 10, at 88 (dissenting opinion per Stone, J.).
12. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ; cf. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adams,
310 U.S. 381 (1940). For discussion of the Carter case, see CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 134; 2 Pusny, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 746 (1951).
13. CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 45.
14. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ; Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935);
Louisville Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) ; Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) ; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) ; Ashwander v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) ; Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) ; Ashton
v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) ; Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587 (1936). See also Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935);
Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935) ; Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
15. Seu the President's Message of February 5, 1937, to the Seventy-fifth Congress,
H.R. Doc. No. 142, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; Attorney General Cummings' letter to the Presi-
dent of February 2, 1937; and the President's address broadcast from the White House on
March 9, 1937, all reproduced in JAcKSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 328-51. See also ROSEN-
MAI, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 146 (1952).
Roosevelt was not the first President to show impatience with old age on the Supreme
Court. In the first year of his administration Taft wrote to Senator Lodge: "It is an out-
rage that the four men ["those old fools," Taft called them] on the bench who are over
seventy should continue there and thus throw the work and responsibility on the other five."
1 PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TILmES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TArT 530 (1939).
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became clear by J\White Monday, March 29, 1937,16 or at the latest by April 12,
193 7 ,17 that discretion was going to be the better part of judicial valor. At least
the climate of the Court's opinion suddenly changed.' 8 Although the battle for
a new Court was lost, the war to sustain the New Deal's legislation was definite-
ly won.1 9 Later in 1937 a vacancy gave the President the opportunity to ap-
point Senator Black to the Court. In a short span of later years the President
was able to put on the Court a number of Justices of his own choosing.20
A NEW BRAND OF ECONOMICS
As Justice Black came to the Supreme Court, restless spirits were busy dis-
turbing the academic peace of the economists. Arguments to the Supreme
16. Vest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the Minimum Wage Act of Washington and overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), was decided on March 29th. It has been claimed that Presi-
dent Roosevelt's "court-packing" assault on the Court had no bearing whatever on this
"about-face" of the Court. 2 PusEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 703, 757, 766, 771 (1951).
But Pusey admits that it did "clinch the victory of the liberal-minded men within the
Court." 2 id. at 703. It has been cynically observed that "a switch in time saves nine." Freund,
Review and Federalism, in CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREXE LAW 93 (1954). See
also ROSENMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 161.
17. On this date the Court announced its decisions in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Fried-
man-Harry Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) ; and Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103 (1937), upholding the National Labor Relations Act.
18. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), 304 U.S. 1 (1938), 307 U.S. 183
(1939) ; Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) ; Duke Power Co. v. Grui-
wood County, 299 U.S. 259 (1936) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) ; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) ; United
States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937). See Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American
Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) ; Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300
U.S. 440 (1937); Virginian Ry. v. System Federation 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, AFL, 300
U.S. 515 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 17; NLRB v. Fruc-
hauf Co., supra note 17; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Clothing Co., supra note 17; Asso-
ciated Press v. NLRB, supra note 17; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; Cincinnati
Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937) ; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,
301 U.S. 468 (1937) ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) ; Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) ; Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) ; Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303
U.S. 41.9 (1938) ; United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) ; Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) ;
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533 (1939) ; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939) ; H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939).
Roosevelt once referred to the "definite turning point" in 1937 in a Court which had
been thwarting the common will of a majority of the American people. 2 PUSEY, CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES 766 (1951). See also CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 159; ROSEN AN,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 161.
19. ROSENMAN, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 161.
20. After Hugo Black, President Roosevelt appointed justices Reed, Frankfurter,
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Court in favor of experimental legislation designed to relieve an extraordinary
emergency were beginning to depart from established doctrines of laissez faire
and to put unprecedented emphasis upon the promotion of the general welfare.
Moreover, an English economist named Keynes, who had acquired great wealth
and was later to acquire a title, joined intellectual forces with an American
banker named Eccles, who was also being unfaithful to his wealthy class, to
preach startling doctrines of a compensatory economy. To these prophets of a
new economic deal, and to many who followed in their rapidly moving foot-
steps, debts were the other side of investment and not in themselves sinful. Nor
was saving an unadulterated virtue. In their opinion the forces of supply and
demand would not, as the classical economists thought, necessarily keep the
economy at the full employment level. The interest rate was not a perfect
mechanism which assured that demand for investment goods would always be
forthcoming in an amount sufficient to utilize all resources not being used for
meeting consumer demand. Investment sometimes needed the encouragement
of governmental action; government was an indispensable partner of business
rather than its patron. Perhaps worst of all in the eyes of some, this new fiscal
philosophy called for a tax system which would counteract tendencies toward
disproportionate saving, and promote tendencies to enlarge consumption to
keep it in step with rises in productive capacity.
This was a persuasive and an ominous rationalization of a progressive tax
system which would impose a heavier burden upon high bracket incomes, which
are largely saved, than upon low bracket incomes, which are largely spent. It
is hardly surprising that the higher income groups did not feel like taking these
new heresies lying down. The opposition of many became almost religious in
its intensity; a national deficit became in protesting minds a criminal act; and
even the ravages of depression were thought by some to be preferable to prof-
ligate government spending. But there was ultimate victory in modified form
for many of the Keynesian doctrines, and an ultimate demonstration of the
truth of Keynes' observation that "the power of vested interests is vastly
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. . . . [I]t is
ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil," 21 and rule
the world. For Keynes commanded the future from his study more than Na-
poleon had from his throne. Many of his ideas triumphed in the ideological
battles that began in the mid-thirties, and have by now been translated into
practices that would have been unthinkable in the golden twenties.
TAXES IN A GREAT DEPRESSION
Even Roosevelt's worst enemies would hardly have disagreed with his asser-
tion that the mid-thirties were "changing times." By the middle of 1937, change,
Douglas, furphy, Byrnes, Jackson and Rutledge. In 1941 he raised Associate Justice
Stone to Chief Justice.
21. KPvxwEs, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383-84
(1936).
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with its long arm, its disturbing touch, its decree of things not yet manifest,
was making what was left of wealth sorrowful and afraid. Newness had sud-
denly acquired a new prevalence and scope and acceleration, so that the years
of the lives of men then in high places began to measure not some small growth
or rearrangement or moderation of what they had learned in childhood, but a
great upheaval. Depression and gloom gripped a formerly ecstatic economy.
New and suspicious brands of taxation were finding favor on Capitol Hill. In
1936 Congress had stunned the business and financial world by passing an un-
distributed profits tax suggested by a heretical President. The bill enacted was
not the Administration proposal, and even the Senate version of the bill was
not to the liking of Senators Black and LaFollette of the Finance Committee,
who suggested substantial amendment. Their substitute bill would have col-
lected $600 million annually from the "privileged" higher income group which
was avoiding the higher individual income taxes.22 Joined by Senator Norris,
Senators Black and LaFollette fought for the Administration bill on the floor
of the Senate. They fought in vain, and the bill that did pass came to a sad
and quick end in 1939 23 in response to a vigorous campaign of objection
throughout the short period of its existence.
The undistributed profits tax was not the only villain of the troubled times
that brought Hugo Black to the Supreme Court. In 1935 President Roosevelt
had suggested a tax upon inheritances which "bless neither those who bequeath
nor those who receive,"'24 and the Congress of which Black was a member had
responded with increased estate tax rates.25
The most dramatic events were taking place in June and July of 1937, just
before Black's appointment to the Supreme Court. A revived Treasury, no
longer reconciled to tax avoidance de h.re, was presenting to a joint congres-
sional committee a lurid and unbelievable story of tax avoidance.20 Witnesses
22. 80 CONG. REc. 8809 (1936).
23. Revenue Act of 1936, § 14, 49 STAT. 1655, repealed by Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 15,
53 STAT. 9.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
25. See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 14 (1942).
26. A lurid tale was unfolded before the Joint Committee. In order to siphon assets
and income out of the United States, prominent American citizens had deserted the pro-
tection and advantages of the established corporate laws of the states in their country to put
their assets in corporations established under the corporate laws of Nassau, an insignificant
foreign island in the Atlantic Ocean, known principally as a winter pleasure resort, and in
corporations established under the laws of other neighboring foreign jurisdictions such as
Panama, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island. Some American ta-payers were claim-
ing wholly fictitious interest deductions for so-called loans from a company incorporated
in the Bahama Islands which masqueraded as an insurance company. Domestic "incor-
porated pocketbooks," formed to insulate interest and dividends from the individual income
tax, had multiplied like mushrooms. The owners of farms, racing stables, and even yachts,
had incorporated their pleasures to make them businesses. One wealthy woman supplied
her husband with pocket money by having the corporation that owned her country estate
employ her husband as a manager. Multiple trusts were being used to obtain additional
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at public hearings before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance
described schemes and mentioned names. The "red herring" investigation, as
it was called, filled newspapers with scandalous detail. A hot summer was
cooler than many tempers. Though it provided "juicy copy," to use a term
coined by Time Magazine, the press was not happy with the investigation. The
New York Times conceded that the government should not tolerate evasion or
fraud, but wondered if the Administration itself had set an example of scrupu-
lous fairness. The New York Herald Tribune accused the "master drawer of
herrings" of trying to give the impression that the failure of the rich to pay
their income taxes, rather than some failures of the Administration, was re-
sponsible for the deficit. In impersonal language David Lawrence made per-
sonal reference to substantial charitable contributions by the First Lady of the
land which were certainly in a different moral, and even legal, category from
most of the avoidance schemes disclosed in the hearings. Senator Vandenberg
used the investigation as a springboard for another reference to his favorite
subject. "I wish," he said, "there was as much enthusiasm about stopping loop-
holes in expenditures. If we took all income of tax-dodgers, we would still be
sunk in a tragic deficit."
In the Revenue Act of 1937 27 Congress responded with some stern measures
to curb tax avoidance of the bold sort revealed in the hearings. The Act became
law on August 26, 1937, just after justice Black's confirmation. As he later
discovered, it fell far short of making the tax structure avoidance-proof, but it
closed for good and all a number of the loopholes the President had called to
the attention of Congress. It did not attempt to deal with community property,
family partnerships, pension trusts and percentage depletion-subjects which
had been mentioned by the President. But tax avoidance was never again to
he the simple matter it had been previously; it was destined to develop into a
finer and subtler art, requiring more skillful devices, greater imagination, and
a closer attention to detail.
TA4x LAW AT A CROSSROADS
A consciousness of the inadequacy of many accepted notions of law had come
to lawyers perhaps even before dissatisfaction with their established creeds
began to plague some of the more open-minded of the economists. "In the brief
space of about seventy years," said Justice Stone in 1937, "our law has been
called upon to accommodate itself to changes of conditions, social and economic,
more marked and extensive in their creation of new interests requiring legal
protection and control than occurred in the three centuries which followed the
pirsunal tu:emltions and to split income into large numbers of separate units each of which
wvuld st)rt with a low tax bracket. Leading cartoonists, violinists and motion picture
actors were resorting to the device of incorporating their personal talents. Hearings Before
the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). See
lPaul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. Ci. L. REv. 41 (1937).
27. 50 STAT. 813.
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discovery of America." 28 This description of the developments creating new
necessities for law in the period prior to 1937 would be a vast understatement
of the tumbling stream of events that followed Justice Black's appointment to
the Supreme Court. Franklin D. Roosevelt made his famous, prophetic quaran-
tine speech in 1937. In September 1939, German troops marched into Poland,
and-in the vivid metaphor of a Chinese statesman-the sky was suddenly
"black with the wings of chickens coming home to roost." The inevitable
quickly followed. Early on a Sunday morning in December 1941, a Japanese
air squadron descended from the blue of the Hawaiian skies to cripple the
American Navy. Just as suddenly the law had to face the problems of WVorld
War II. In a short time it was being forced to carry a heavy load associated
with price and wage control, rationing, credit control, foreign funds control,
renegotiation, and a burden of additional tax controversy incident to war rates
of taxation. The complications of a scarce labor market and military procure-
ment added to the responsibilities put upon law in this riotous period.
World War II also changed the pace and scale of fiscal development. Ex-
perience taught an incredulous people that an internal debt of $275 billion does
not wreck a prosperous nation. In one year the federal budget rose to more
than twice the amount of the national income of the depression year 1933, and
to even more than the national income of the halcyon year 1929. Unemploy-
ment all but disappeared. The anemic purchasing power of the thirties sudden-
ly became an eager giant ready to devour much more than the country's busy
industrial plant could produce. Goods, not buyers, were lacking; a sellers'
market replaced a buyers' market of more than a decade. A country grown
weary of deflation had more inflation than it wanted. The new objective was
to find means of production to win the war and at the same time supply goods
for the constantly increasing civilian spending power created by war activities.
War had brought too much prosperity. 29
World War II and the years that followed also brought new meanings and
values and magnitudes to taxation. It was out of all question to pay completely
for the war as we went. That would have wrecked the production effort, so
essential to winning the war. The home front problem was inflation, with
danger potentials almost as great and evil as war itself. Taxation was used
not only to help finance the war effort but, in partnership with direct controls
and assisted by an unexpected pattern of savings, to control inflation. There
was some inflation, but military victory in the war abroad finally came to a
country unravaged by inflation at home. Something else came too-a realiza-
tion by many people that a nation can thrive under a staggering burden of
taxation, and that taxation is one of the most valuable instruments of economic
control the world has ever known. No longer would taxes be merely the ex-
actions of a greedy government that spends and spends and spends, or even a
28. Stone, The Conwn Law in the United States, in THE FuTURE OF THE COMMsON
LAw 129 (1937).
29. See PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 279 (1954).
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government that fails to spend enough. No longer would taxes be for revenue
only; thenceforth, the power to tax, in association with other governmental
powers, would be exercised in the light of a new sense of federal responsibility
for the welfare of the economy.30 It would be a power to fulfill a better destiny
for the American people.
JUSTICE BLACK'S QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT
Of such were the times in which Hugo Black assumed the responsibilities of
a Justice of the Supreme Court. From the perspective of today it is startling
to consider how myopic was the discussion, in the late thirties, of his qualifica-
tions for the role he has performed so well. Few talked at the time about the
Senator's capacity to deal with the legal aspects of the problems many new tax
and fiscal urgencies would bring to the Supreme Court. Indeed, the problems
themselves were only dimly visible on a distant horizon. There was, however,
a widespread belief that Black was not sufficiently learned in the intricacies of
the law to serve competently on" the highest Court of the land. In May of 1938
Marquis Childs reported that Black was causing his colleagues on the Court
"acute discomfort and embarrassment" because he was "unable to carry his
share of the heavy burden of work that falls on the Court." 31 In the light of
the justice's performance this was puzzling comment even at the time it was
made. The fact was that few men have come to the Court better equipped.
The Justice had had a meager formal training in the law, it is true.3 2 But
so had John Marshall,3 3 and so have other Supreme Court Justices. 34 From
an obscure beginning Black had risen to eminence in the practice of law; much
of this practice had been in the appellate courts.35 He had had eighteen months'
experience as a police court judge. He had seen considerable service as a prose-
cuting attorney. A Democrat, he had been selected by Republican Attorney
General Stone to represent the Department of Justice in some important Pro-
hibition cases. He had been elected to the Senate in 1926 and by 1937 had
served in that body for almost two terms.36 During this service he learned
30. Cf. Employment Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1952).
31. Childs, The Supreme Court To-day, 176 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 581, 582 (1938).
Eight years later Childs wrote that Black "worked harder than perhaps any justice in the
history of the court" to "vindicate himself and to justify in the law his liberal opinions."
McCuNE, THE NINE YOUNG MEN 33 (1947).
32. See preceding article, Frank, Mr. Justice Black: A Biographical Appreciation, 65
YALE L.J. 454,455 (1956).
33. The closest John Marshall came to a formal education was a year's tutoring by a
visiting minister and several months' schooling in Latin at Westmoreland Academy when
he was fourteen. Marshall did spend six weeks attending lectures on the law given at
William and Mary College. See RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITiCAL HISTORY OF THE Su-
PREMS COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 80 (1955).
34. For instance, Justices Miller and the first Harlan.
35. See J. P. FRANx, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, THE MAN AND His OPINIONS 35 (1949).
36. Among other things, while in the Senate he had conducted an investigation of mail
subsidies and the public utility holding company investigation. This was a fight with a
twelve billion dollar industry which had almost the entire press massed solidly behind it.
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from Senator LaFollette "much of the technical aspects of tax law.' 37 He was
a vigorous fifty-one years old when he was nominated.
Black had supplemented his slight schooling by reading on a broad scale. The
first book he read after his election to the Senate was Adam Smith's Wealth
of Nations. John Draper's History of the Intellectual Development of Europe
led him on to much historical reading, including the writings of Franklin,
Hamilton and John Adams, and all of Jefferson's voluminous writings; the
records of the Federal Constitutional Convention and of the state ratifying
conventions; numerous biographies of Revolutionary and nineteenth century
American political leaders; Warren's and Myers' Supreme Court histories;
most of the writings of Charles Beard; and numerous other historical works.
His reading in Greek, Roman and European history, though less comprehen-
sive, was extensive, and included translations of Herodotus, Thucydides, Plut-
arch, Suetonius, Seneca and Cicero.
Black's reading in other fields was far more than a sampling, and gave him
"a comfortable acquaintance with the social sciences and the humanities."38 He
read Shakespeare frequently, and Milton, and the romantic English poets of
the nineteenth century. He read nineteenth century American writers such as
Hawthorne, Thoreau and Twain. In government and economics he read, among
others, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, Bryce, Mill, Marx and Spencer. He
particularly cherished Veblen. In philosophy he read Aristotle, Spinoza, and
some of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine. His thorough reading of
William James and John Dewey awaited a summer after his appointment to
the Court which he devoted to modern legal philosophy and the American
philosophers in whom that legal philosophy originates.
Those who criticized Black for lack of learning in the intricacies of the law
made out a weak case for their point. True, he had never been a professor,3"
and his judicial experience had been a limited one on a police court.40 Unlike
Brandeis and Cardozo he had never published any scholarly books. But he had
been phenomenally successful in practice, and had had considerable experience
in public life. He had applied himself diligently to the lessons of experience.
His qualifications for the Court compared favorably with those of many
eminent previous appointees, including John Iarshall, Louis D. Brandeis and
Charles Evans Hughes. 41 He had had more experience in practice than Holmes
37. J. P. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, THE MAN AND His OPINIONS 62 (1949).
38. Id. at 47.
39. Three of Roosevelt's eight appointees had been law school professors or deans:
Douglas, Frankfurter and Rutledge.
40. This prior judicial experience exceeded, however, that of six of the other seven
Roosevelt appointees. Twelve of the twenty Justices appointed between 1897 and 1937 had
had prior judicial experience.
41. See FRANKFURTER, The Supreme Court of the United States, in LAW AND POLITICS
21,31 (1939).
Beveridge quotes Schmidt, a writer-contemporary of Chief Justice Marshall: "Mr. Mar-
shall can hardly be regarded as a learned lawyer. His acquaintance with the Roman jur-
prudence as well as with the laws of foreign countries was not very extensive. He was
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or Cardozo. He had had more experience in public service than Pierce Butler
or the later appointed Felix Frankfurter. Altogether, the impression is un-
avoidable that the criticism based upon an alleged deficiency in legal learning
camouflaged objections to other qualities brought to light by Black's public
record and particularly by his work in his second Senate term.
There is, moreover, an odd irrelevance in the stress, in much of the discus-
sion about any Supreme Court appointment, on the appointee's learning in the
law. The postulates of discussion need more analysis than is usually given to
the subject, and less reticence than often characterizes the discussion. For one
thing, learning in the law is a vague, immeasurable abstraction that defies
definition. Possibly the central theme of the concept is a knowledge of past
law in the sense of many precedents and the principles that have accumulated
throughout the centuries. But this kind of knowledge, whatever it may be, can
be gained from many sources. A complete formal education in the arts and
the law is hardly a guarantee that it has been acquired.
But even more important, it must be remembered that most of the major
questions presented to the Supreme Court cannot be answered out of the books
that record the thousands of answers to questions previously presented.42 The
questions that must be decided by the Court are often difficult and delicate
questions of fact 43 that strict logic and a judicious selection among rival pre-
cedents can answer in favor of either side of a controversy. 44 A resourceful
judge can give almost any conclusion a logical form.45 But as a basis for de-
what is called a common lawyer in the best & noblest acceptation of that term." 2 BEVE-
RIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 178 (1916).
42. See FRXNKFURTmR, The Zeitgeist and The Judiciary, in LAW AND POLITICS 4-5
(1939).
43. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 410-11 (1932), contains a paragraph that is well worth quoting:
"In the cases which now come before us there is seldom any dispute as to the
interpretation of any provision. The controversy is usually over the application to
existing conditions of some well-recognized constitutional limitation. This is strik-
ingly true of cases under the due process clause when the question is whether a
statute is unreasunable, arbitrary or capricious: of cases under the equal protection
clause when the question is whether there is any reasonable basis for the classifica-
tion made by a statute; and of cases under the commerce clause when the question
is whether an admitted burden laid by a statute upon interstate commerce is so sub-
stantial as to be deemed direct. These issues resemble, fundamentally, that of reason-
able care in negligence cases, the determination of which is ordinarily left to the ver-
dict of the jury. In every such case the decision, in the first instance, is dependent upon
the determination of what in legal parlance is called a fact, as distinguished from the
declaration of a rule of law. When the underlying fact has been found, the legal
result follows inevitably. The circumstance that the decision of that fact is made by
a court, instead of by a jury, should not be allowed to obscure its real character."
44. See BRANT, STORM OVER THE CoNsTITUTiox 241 (1936) ; LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BUSH 156 (1930) ; Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUm. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949) ; Hamil-
ton, Judicial Process, in 8 ENcYc. OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 450, 451 (1932) ; Stone, supra
note 28, at 140.
45. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1952).
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cision, logic must yield first place to experience, and in the Supreme Court
"the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, in-
tuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious," have "a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be gov-
erned." 46 There is in the equation of most important decisions of the Supreme
Court a clash of policy, an element of imponderable conflict between competing
social and economic philosophies or forces in our society. And as Justices
Holmes and Stone have intimated, the prejudices that a judge shares with his
fellow men and the individual predilections of each Justice toward the prob-
lem before the Court may affect his decision.4 7 "Traditional beliefs, acquired
convictions, an outlook on life, and a conception of social ends" are some of
the deep forces that tug at judges. 48
It is, in sum, a myth that the Supreme Court is either an impersonal or a
nonpolitical body. It makes many political decisions, 49 especially in constitu-
tional matters, ° not in the "sense of partisanship but in the sense of policy-
making." This political role of the Court has been too obscure to laymen, and
even to many lawyers. Constitutional interpretation, and to a large extent
statutory interpretation, compel the translation of policy into judgment. In
this process of interpretation the Justices of the Court gather meaning not only
from reading the Constitution and the statutes, but also from reading life.,2
These are some of the considerations which influence Presidents in their
selection of Supreme Court Justices. Of course Presidents look to an ap-
pointee's legal learning and equipment, his experience at the bar, his reputation
46. HOLMES, THE COXsMoN LAW 1 (1881). See also J. N. FRANx, COURTS ON TRIAL
147 (1950) ; Stone, Fallacies of Logical Form in English Law, in INTERPRETATIONS OF
MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 696 (1947).
47. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); Justice Stone, dissenting (with Justices
Brandeis and Cardozo) in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633
(1936). See Lincoln's statement that Supreme Court Justices "have, with others, the same
passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps." Quoted in RODELL, Op. Cit.
supra note 33, at 134. Justice Miller of the Supreme Court once said: "It is vain to contend
with judges who have been, at the bar, the advocates of railroad companies, and all the
forms of associated capital, when they are called upon to decide cases Where such interests
are in contest. All their training, all their feelings are from the start in favor of those who
need no such influence." Id. at 146.
48. Hamilton, supra note 44, at 456; see J. N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
111 (1930).
49. See FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1949). See also PRuT-
cHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT xiii, 14, 282 (1948); Schlesinger, The Supreme Court:
1947, Fortune, Jan. 1947, p. 73.
50. This is true because the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come,
and consequently to be adapted to the various crises in human affairs." Marshall, C.J., in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) *316, *415 (1819).
51. JAcKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SysTEm OF GOVERNMENT 54
(1955). See also CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE, viii, 60-61 (1947).
52. See FRANKFURTER, The Supreme Court of the United States, in LAW AND POLITICS
30 (1939).
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among his colleagues and the judges before whom he has appeared, the charac-
ter of his clientele, and many other items that add up to the total of the tech-
nical ability he can bring to a judicial job. But even though the Supreme Court
is an institution, an appointing President knows that individuals, with all their
diversities of endowment, experience and outlook, determine its actions.5 3 He
therefore wisely looks far beyond the horizon of strictly legal capacity. He
knows, with Chesterton, that the most important thing about a man is his
philosophy. The determining factor is, and should be, the appointee's approach
to, and attitude toward, the social and economic questions of the day.
Some Presidents have candidly revealed the considerations that guided them
in selecting members of the Supreme Court. Lincoln once gave his reasons for
appointing Chase as Chief Justice. One was Chase's large place in the public
mind. Another was that "we wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what
has been done in regard to emancipation and the legal tenders. We cannot ask
a man what he will do, and if we should, and he should answer us we should
despise him for it. Therefore, we must take a man whose opinions are known."5 4
In a letter to Senator Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt gave the reasons why he was
in favor of Justice Holmes. "The ablest lawyers and the greatest judges," he
said, were men whose past "has naturally brought them into close relationship
with the wealthiest and the most powerful clients," and Roosevelt was glad
when he could find a judge like Holmes "who has been able to preserve his
aloofness of mind so as to keep his broad humanity of feeling and his sympathy
for the class from which he has not drawn his clients."55 Roosevelt went on to
add that a judge of the Supreme Court should be neither "partisan" nor "poli-
tician" in the "ordinary and low sense" which we attach to these words. But
"in the higher sense, in the proper sense," he should be "a party man, a con-
structive statesman, constantly keeping in mind his adherence to the principles
and policies under which this nation has been built up and in accordance with
which it must go on."5 6 And Roosevelt wanted to know that Judge Holmes
53. See FRANKFURTER, Justice Holmws Defines the Constitution, in LAW AND POLITICS
62 (1939). Even Brandeis, according to his biographer, "was inclined by the pressures and
drives of his own nature to translate his own economic and social views into the Constitution
itself." MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 580 (1946).
54. 3 VARREN, TnE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 123 (1924). See
also Gideon Welles' statement about Evarts as a possible appointee for the Supreme Court.
Answering a question from Lincoln, Welles stated that Evarts was "among the foremost
at the New York Bar." He then went on to say that that was not all: "Our Chief Justice
must have a judicial mind, be upright, of strict integrity, not too pliant; should be a states-
man and a politician." He then added that by "politician" he did not mean a "partisan."
He meant one who was "impressed with the principles and doctrines which had brought
this Administration into power"; it was all-important that Lincoln "should have a Judge
who would be a correct and faithful expositor of the principles of his Administration and
policy after his Administration shall have closed." Id. at 125-26.
55. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND PoLITIcs 66 (1939).
56. Id. at 67; see 2 PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 739
(1939).
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was "in entire sympathy with our views, that is, with your views and mine,"
before he would feel justified in appointing him.57
It was not wholly accidental that Wilson had an opportunity to appoint only
three Justices in his eight years of presidency whereas Taft in his four years
had appointed six members to the Court. In a candid newspaper conference
held at the time Taft turned over the White House to Wilson in 1913, he said
that he had told his appointees: "Damn you, if any of you die I'll disown
you." 8 Obviously, most of Taft's appointees took his threat to heart. Later,
in the 1920 campaign, Taft urged the election of Mr. Harding on the ground
that four of the incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court were beyond the
retiring age of seventy, so that the next President would probably be called
upon to appoint their successors. He urged that the election of Harding would
help to insure the maintenance of the Supreme Court "as the bulwark to en-
force the guaranty that no man shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law." 9 Taft likewise saw the Court as a check on President Hoover,
whom he suspected of liberal intervals. He once confessed that though he was
"older and slower and less acute and more confused," he must stay on the
Court as long as things continued as they were and he was able to answer in
his place, "to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control."""
Political considerations of this kind are particularly relevant to appointments
made during a period like the mid-thirties, and President Roosevelt might well
have looked less to legal learning than to his version of wisdom in making the
selections he made. Much of the legal learning of the past had crumbled before
his eyes while he was in office. The education of most eligibles for the Court
at that time had been acquired in large part in a past that was gone forever. It
had been reversed by a powerful march of events that had swept away its foun-
dations. It was dated. A new learning had to be assembled in a dazzling
process of trial and error. At such a time a vested interest in obsolete legal
learning might be a handicap to a new Justice on the Supreme Court. 1 What
was needed more than scholarship in any pedestrian sense of that term, and
over and above strictly legal learning, was adaptability of attitude, a capacity
for rapid assimilation of the lessons that violent experience was forcing upon
57. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND PoLITIcs 67 (1939) ; see 2 PRINGLE, Op. cit. stpra note
56, at 739.
58. 2 PRINGLE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 854.
59. Taft, Mr. Wilson and the Campaign, 10 YALE REV. 1, 19-20 (1920).
60. 2 PRINGLE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 967. Cf. Wilson's letter to Justice Clarke, one
of his appointees, when the latter resigned from the Court in 1922: "Like thousands of
other liberals throughout the country, I have been counting on the influence of you and
Justice Brandeis to restrain the Court in some measure from the extreme reactionary course
which it seems inclined to follow .... The most obvious and immediate danger to which
we are exposed is that the courts will more and more outrage the common people's sense
of justice and cause a revulsion against judicial authority which may seriously disturb the
equilibrium of our institutions, and I see nothing which can save us from this danger if the
Supreme Court is to repudiate a liberal course of thought and action."
61. Cf. McCuNE, THE NINE YOUNG MEN 46 (1947).
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puzzled minds, and a mature acceptance of life in a chaotic new world that had
replaced the world in which most existing legal learning had developed.
STARE DEcisIS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD
Justice Black's concurring opinion in Helvering v. Gerhardt,6 2 decided short-
ly after he joined the Court, was truly what Chief Justice Hughes in speaking
of dissents had called "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the in-
telligence of a future day." 3 It gave early proof that Justice Black was not
the kind of judge "to deny the reality of change" or to "conceal the truth of
adaptation behind a verbal disguise of fixity and universality."4 Rather he
would, in the democratic tradition, choose the principle of blunt, open and
direct disclosure.6  Black's Gerhardt opinion furnished as well an indication of
his attitude toward stare decisis.
The Gerhardt case involved the constitutional power of the federal govern-
ment to impose income tax upon salaries received by employees of the Port of
New York Authority, a bi-state corporation created by compact between New
York and New Jersey to operate transportation facilities between the two
states. The taxpayers relied principally upon M1cCulloch v. Maryland 66 and
Collector v. Day.67 In the former case Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in-
validated a state tax upon national banks. In the latter the Court held that the
salary of a state probate judge was immune from the federal income tax.
Justice Stone, as spokesman for the Court in upholding the challenged tax,
composed the cautious, compromise type of opinion that would satisfy some
other Justices by hiding innovation "behind a formal distinction."'6 8 He proved
himself equal to the dexterous task of sustaining the tax without overruling
Collector v. Day. He accomplished this objective by distinguishing and limit-
ing that case, giving it lip service but confining its message to its particular
facts.60 Collector v. Day had involved a tax upon the salary of an officer "en-
gaged in the performance of an indispensable function of the state which can-
not be delegated to private individuals. '70 But the tax challenged in the Ger-
hardt case neither precluded nor threatened "unreasonably to obstruct any
62. 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938). For a discussion of this case, see PRITCHETT, THE
RooSEvELT COURT 61 (1948).
63. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928). As to the func-
tion of dissents, and sometimes of separate concurring opinions, see Powell, And Repent at
LeLwsre, 58 HARv. L. REv. 930, 943 (1945) ; PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 50 (1948);
Hamilton, supra note 44, at 455.
64. J. N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 293 (1930).
65. Cf. Douglas, supra note 44, at 754.
66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) *316 (1819).
67. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
68. Hamilton, supra note 44, at 453. See also id. at 455; Cardozo, Law and Literature,
14 YALE L.J. 699, 715 (1925) ; PRITCHETT, THE RoOsEVELT COURT 51 (1948).
69. Cf. J. N. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 275 (1950) ; LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH
63 (1930).
70. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938).
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function essential to the continued existence of the state government."'" So
much of the burden of the tax laid upon the taxpayer's salary as might reach
the state was "but a necessary incident to the co-existence within the same
organized government of the two taxing sovereigns," and hence was a burden
contemplated by the Constitution. 72
While Justice Black agreed that the payment of a nondiscriminatory federal
income tax on their salaries by employees of the Port of New York Authority
would not impair or defeat the governmental operations of the State of New
York, he was unable to reconcile the majority opinion with the principle an-
nounced in Collector v. Day and later opinions applying that principle. To him
the rule established by the majority opinion made the tax status of every state
employee uncertain until the Supreme Court passed upon the classification of
his particular employment, and created a "confusion in the field of inter-gov-
ernmental tax immunity" which the new Justice believed could be "clarified
by complete review of the subject."' 73 The uncertainty and' inequality of treat-
ment created by the test was manifest: there might be a tax upon the income
of an officer of a state-operated transportation system but none upon the income
of the manager of a municipal water works system.
In Black's view the Gerhardt case afforded an appropriate occasion for a
thorough re-examination of the rule of Collector v. Day. His opinion ended
with these two paragraphs:
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation
between essential and nonessential governmental functions. MIany govern-
mental functions of today have at some time in the past been non-govern-
mental. The genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of
constitutional action, the people-acting not through the courts but through
their elected legislative representatives-have the power to determine as
conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires.
"Surely, the Constitution contains no imperative mandate that public
employees-or others-drawing equal salaries (income) should be divided
into taxpaying and non-taxpaying groups. Ordinarily such a result is dis-
crimination. Uniform taxation upon those equally able to bear their fair
shares of the burdens of government is the objective of every just govern-
ment. The language of the Sixteenth Amendment empowering Congress
to 'collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived'-given its
most obvious meaning-is broad enough to accomplish this purpose. '74
Further re-examination of the doctrine of Collector v. Day came more
promptly than Justice Black could have anticipated. Within two years the case
was explicitly overruled insofar as it recognized "an implied constitutional
immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of a
national or a state government or their instrumentalities.' 75
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 426.
74. Id. at 427.
75. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939). See JACKsoN,
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 243 (1941).
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Black's concurring opinion in the Gerhardt case illustrated at an early date
a basic attitude of Roosevelt's first appointee to the Court. It was incumbent
upon the Court, in his view, to face constitutional issues squarely. Obsolete
doctrines should be abandoned "openly and avowedly."'70 The interpretation
of the Constitution should move forward with changing times.77 Its dynamic
march should not be obstructed by an unwillingness to overrule precedents
simply because they were hallowed with age. The Court must bow "to the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate
also in the judicial function. 7 8
The rule of stare decisis has "only a limited application in the field of con-
stitutional law."'79 It has more potency in cases where correction can be achieved
through legislation than in those involving the Constitution, where correction
is only possible through the laborious process of amendment.80 But "legislative
correction of judicial errors is often difficult to effect," 8' and the courts must
occasionally take a hand in dispelling error that they have themselves produced.
So in Commissioner v. Estate of Church 8 2 Justice Black spoke for a majority
of the Court in stating that the policy of stare decisis and "an alleged interest
in stability and certainty"8 3 should not prevent the Court from overruling its
decision in May v. Heiner,8 4 handed down eighteen years previously and re-
affirmed in three per curiam decisions joined in by Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone.83
The Church case involved the interpretation of that part of section 811(c)
of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code which required the inclusion in a decedent's
gross estate of the value of all property the decedent had transferred to a trust
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death."8 "
76. Douglas, J., dissenting (with Black, J.) in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,
49, 57 (1944) ; cf. the Black dissent in McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 65 (1944).
77. See J. P. FRANK, MR. JUsTIcE BLACK, THE MAN AND His OPINIONS 109 (1949).
78. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08
(1932). Justice Brandeis' protest in this case was a fruitful one. See Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) ; Oklahoma Tax Comm'r v. United States, 319 U.S.
598 (1943).
79. Douglas, J., dissenting (with Black, J.) in New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 590 (1946). On the subject of stare decisis in general, see Douglas, sutra note 44;
J. N. FRANK, CouRTs oN TRIAL 262 (1950).
80. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting opinion). See also CuRTis, LioNs UNDER THE THRONE 56-57 (1947).
81. Douglas, supra note 44, at 746-47; cf. FREUND, op. cit. sopra note 49, at 38.
82. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
83. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 647 (1949).
84. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
85. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) ; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
783 (1931) ; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
86. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 STAT. 1. See also Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner,
335 U.S. 701 (1949), involving the interpretation of the same provision with reference to a
trust with a possibility of reverter.
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The question was whether property in a trust was includible in the taxable
estate of its grantor because of a clause reserving its income to the grantor for
life. Against the strong trend of previous authority, the Supreme Court had
held in May v. Heiner that the property was not to be included. After the re-
affirmation of this astonishing ruling in the per curiam decisions referred to,5 7
Congress had promptly responded with a joint resolution 8s providing for the
inclusion of the property of such a trust in the grantor's estate, and this joint
resolution had been incorporated in the 1932 Act,89 at least as to trusts created
after the passage of the resolution.9 The trust in the Church case had been set
up before the resolution; and so the vitality of May v. Heiner was still in ques-
tion. Justice Black's majority opinion held that May v. Heiner should no
longer be accepted as a controlling interpretation of the "possession or enjoy-
ment" clause of section 811(c) because Helvering v. Hallock 91 "directly and
unequivocally rejected the only support that could possibly suffice" for what
the Court held in May v. Heiner.92 Speaking of a transfer in trust with a
reservation of a life interest, he wrote:
"How is it possible to call this trust transfer 'complete' except by in-
voking a fiction? Church was sole owner of the stocks before the transfer.
Probably their greatest property value to Church was his continuing right
To get their income .... That property right did not pass to the trust
beneficiaries when the trust was executed: it remained in Church until he
died. He made no 'complete' gift effective before that date, unless we view
the trust transfer as a 'complete' gift to the trustees. But Church gave the
trustees nothing, either partially or completely. He transferred no right
to them to get and spend the stock income. And under the teaching of the
Hallock case, quite in contrast to that of May v. Heiner, passage of th(
mere technical legal title to a trustee is not necessarily crucial in determin-
87. See cases cited note 85 supra.
88. Resolution of March 3, 1931, c. 452, 46 STAT. 1516. See RODELL, NINE MEN: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPRE.ME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 37 (1955).
89. Revenue Act of 1932, § 302(c), 47 STAT. 279.
90. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
91. 309 U.S. 106 (1940), overruling Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S.
39 (1935), and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935). The taxpayer in
the Hallock case had created a trust providing that the income from the trust property
should be paid to his wife during her lifetime; that upon his death, if she survived him,
the corpus of the trust should go to her or other named beneficiaries, but that upon her
death, if he survived, the property should revert to himself. The wife survived. The case
held, briefly, that the value of the remainder interest should be included in the decedent's
gross estate as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
grantor's death. The Hallock decision is ably discussed in Eisenstein, The Hallock Prob-
lem: A Case Study in Administration, 58 HARV. L. REv. 1141 (1945).
92. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 643 (1949). Justice Black refused
to accept the argument that the error of May v. Heiner should be continued because of
Treasury regulations which had accepted that decision, and the argument that Congress had
ratified the doctrine of the case when it passed the Joint Resolution. He also found no
merit in the contention that subsequent cases set at rest all questions as to the soundness of
the May v, Heiner interpretation. See also Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 153 F.2d 172,
174 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting opinion).
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ing whether and when a gift becomes 'complete' for estate tax purposes.
Looking to substance and not merely to form, as we must unless we depart
from the teaching of Hallock, the inescapable fact is that Church retained
for himself until death a most valuable property right in these stocks-the
right to get and to spend their income. Thus Church did far more than
attach a 'string' to a remotely possible reversionary interest in the prop-
erty, a sufficient reservation under the Hallock rule to make the value of
the corpus subject to an estate tax. Church did not even risk attaching an
unbreakable cable to the most valuable property attribute of the stocks,
their income. He simply retained this valuable property, the right to the
income, for himself until death, when for the first time the stock with all
its property attributes 'passed' from Church to the trust beneficiaries. Even
if the interest of Church was merely 'obliterated,' in May v. Heiner lan-
guage, it is beyond all doubt that simultaneously with his death, Church
no longer owned the right to the income; the beneficiaries did. It had then
'passed.' It never had before. For the first time, the gift had become 'com-
plete.' -93
Justice Frankfurter, who had written the Hallock majority opinion, dis-
agreed sharply with Justice Black's majority opinion in the Church case. He
thought that it reflected an inappropriate attitude toward a series of long stand-
ing unanimous decisions of the Court, and too little respect for the expressed
intention of Congress. To him, also, stare decisis was not "a universal, inex-
orable command," but neither was it "a doctrine of the dead hand."9 4 It made
a difference to him, as it did not to Justice Black, that the Court was not deal-
ing in the Church case with "a ruling which cramps the power of government,"
or with "a constitutional adjudication which time and experience have proved
a parochial instead of a spacious view of the Constitution and which thus calls
for self-correction by the Court without waiting for the leaden-footed process
of constitutional amendment"; that the Court was dealing, rather, with an ex-
ercise of the Court's "duty to construe what Congress has enacted with ample
powers on its part quickly and completely to correct misconstruction." 95
It required about 55,000 words to express the divergent views of the various
members of the Supreme Court in the Church case and its companion, the
Spiegel case. 06 Despite this "outbreak of ... explanation," the blood pressure
of the tax bar rose to a new high if for no other reason, Adrian DeWind has
explained,9 7 than the short shrift the decision gave to the doctrine of stare decisis
as a protection for entrenched interest in error. The Treasury, discreetly feel-
ing that it had won too much for its own comfort, decided that the early error
of the Supreme Court was too deeply embedded in tax law to be fully corrected
immediately. Accordingly, the Treasury partially reinstated the earlier over-
ruled doctrine of the Supreme Court, by a regulation that made the new cor-
93. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, supra note 92, at 644-45.
94. Id. at 676.
95. Id. at 676-77.
96. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949). See note 86 supra.
97. DeWind, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, in 1949 ANUAL SURVEY OF AmERICAx
LAW 225, 226 (1949).
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rect doctrine inapplicable to the estates of decedents dying before January 17,
1949,98 the date of the Church decision. An even more generous Congress
quickly granted further relief. In the Technical Changes Act of 1949 01 it ex-
tended to January 1, 1950, the immunity granted by the Treasury in its amended
regulation. The theory was that some months would be needed to relinquish
or assign the life estates which condemned entire estates to the impact of the
estate tax.100 Under this provision the new rule established by the Church case
would apply only to decedents dying after December 31, 1949. In addition, the
statute allowed a further period in which to transfer or relinquish the tainted
life interests. Transfers in 1949 and 1950 escaped gift tax; transfers in 1949
escaped the possibility of the charge that they were made in contemplation of
death; and transfers in 1951 and later years were to be subject to the gift tax
and the possibility of estate taxation if they were found to have been made in
contemplation of death. The Technical Changes Act of 1949 also expressed
disapproval of the Supreme Court decision in the Spiegel case. 1 1
TAX AVOIDANCE IN LATER MANIFESTATION
Tax law has its share of "seductive clichs 10 2 and verbalistic distinctions.
One of the most overworked distinctions in tax opinions and briefs contrasts
the vague alternatives "form" and "substance"-terms which Judge Learned
Hand has called "anodynes for the pains of reasoning.' 03 Though they are
sometimes useful as terms of general contrast, these favorite "catch words and
labels" are "subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors and symbols, and
must be watched with circumspection lest they put us off our guard."'1 4 One
test of a judge is whether he succumbs to the dangers against which Justice
Cardozo thus wisely warned us. And so the question may be asked whether
Justice Black is a clich6 thinker, who lets himself be led astray by these and
other semanticisms of tax lawyers.
It is true that "form" and "substance" are words which appear with reason-
able frequency in opinions written by Justice Black in the field of taxation. "The
incidence of taxation depends," he has said, "upon the substance of a trans-
98. U.S. TREAS. REG. 105, § 81.17 (1949), as amended, T.D. 5741, 1949-2 Cum. BULL.
114.
99. 63 STAT. 894.
100. The action of Congress in 1949 has been described by Professor Doris Bittker of
the Yale Law School as being based upon the theory that many persons who established
trusts relied upon the incorrect decision in May v. Heiner, and that the later decision cor-
recting the error of the earlier decision "disappointed their reasonable expectations"-prin-
cipally their expectation that the error would be perpetuated for all time. Bittker, Church
and Spiegel: The Legislative Sequel, 59 YALE L.J. 395, 414 (1950).
101. See PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 533 (1954).
102. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939).
103. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667
(1932). Cf. CARDOZo, LAW AND LITERATURE 5 (1931) ; Sage v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d
221,224 (2d Cir. 1936).
104. Cardozo, J., in Hanneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 56 (1937).
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action."''10 "In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts,
are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are
not rigidly binding.'"' ° The question in tax cases is whether a gain is "real
and substantial.' u07 "The essence of a gift by trust is the abandonment of con-
trol over the property put in trust," and it is important to note that the grantor
"has neither the form nor substance of control."' 08 "Bookkeeping devices and
paper contrivances should not be permitted to make two payments out of one,"
and the tax statutes do not compel the conclusion that Congress "intended to
reward ingenuity in paper work by granting multiple tax reductions for a
single money payment to discharge a single corporate obligation."'1 9 The Su-
preme Court "must not give effect to any contrivance which would defeat a tax
Congress plainly intended to impose. The use of bookkeeping and accounting
forms and devices cannot be permitted to devitalize valid tax laws." ' 0
These quotations suggest the flavor of Justice Black's basic approach to
tax law. It is to his credit, however, that he is never content to let his
opinions rest upon sweeping generalizations. Fully aware that "general prop-
ositions do not decide concrete cases,""' he puts general terms such as "form"
and "substance" in the context of careful factual accounts of transactions. In
the Court Holding case 112 the facts showed that the sale of corporation prop-
erty by stockholders was, as the Tax Court had found, "in substance the sale
of the corporation,"" 3 and Justice Black held for the Court that it should be
taxed as such. But it did not follow in Justice Black's mind that there could
be no escape from corporate tax if there was a genuine liquidation and distri-
bution and the stockholders were more than mere conduits through which to
pass title. The Cunberland case 114 brought to the Court a transaction in which
the lower court had found that there had been a genuine liquidation. In this
case the Cumberland Company stockholders offered to sell all their stock to
a competing co-operative. The co-operative refused to buy the stock, but
countered with an offer to buy the transmission and distribution equipment of
the Cumberland Company. At the same time the Cumberland shareholders,
desiring to escape payment of the corporate capital gains tax, offered to acquire
the equipment and sell it to the co-operative. The co-operative accepted; the
corporation transferred the equipment to its shareholders in partial liquidation;
after a sale of remaining assets the corporation was dissolved. The shareholders
105. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
106. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939).
107. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938).
108. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943).
109. Helvering v. Sabine Transp. Co., 318 U.S. 306, 312 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
110. Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118, 121 (1938).
111. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905); see
ltter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Dr. Wu, June 16, 1923, in Jus-ncE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLmES, His B¢on NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 164-65 (1936).
112. Court Holding Co., 2 T.C. 531, 539 (1943).
113. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
114. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
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then executed the previously contemplated sale to the co-operative. To the gov-
ernment this looked like another Court Holding case. But not to Justice Black.
A corporation cannot be taxed "when the sale has been made by its stockholders
following a genuine liquidation and dissolution," even though "a major motive
of the shareholders was to reduce taxes." 1 5 The motive of the shareholders was
relevant in determining whether the transaction was "real or a sham," but sales
of physical property following a genuine liquidation distribution cannot "be
attributed to the corporation for tax purposes."" 16
In working his way to this conclusion the Justice was perfectly aware of the
shadowy and artificial character of the distinction between sales by a corpora-
tion and shareholder sales after a distribution in kind. But Congress had chosen
to recognize the distinction, and the Court was bound to follow the mandate
of Congress that different tax consequences should "flow from different
methods by which the shareholders of a closely held corporation may dispose
of corporate property." 17
The Cifinberland opinion of Justice Black, like many other tax opinions of
the Supreme Court, had a legislative sequel. 118 In the new and much publicized
1954 Code Congress made a valiant attempt to eliminate the oddities of tax
consequences that emerge from different ways of selling the assets of liquidat-
ing corporations. 119 Whether this part of an ambitious attempt to make tax
law "simpler and surer ' 12° will prove successful without amendatory legisla-
tion is one of the many things in tax law that remain to be seen. 121
115. Id. at 454-55.
116. Ibid.
117. Id. at 456.
118. E.g., Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952) (overruled by INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 212(3)) ; United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (changed by INT. Ra,.
CODE OF 1954, § 1341) ; Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947) (clarified by INT.
Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 306) ; Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945) (modified by
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, added by 64 STAT. 942 (1950), now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 421) ; 'Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942) (changed by INT. REV. CODE or
1954, 8 164(d)) ; Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) (overruled by Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 23(a) (2), 53 STAT. 12, now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212) ; Helvering
v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (overruled by Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (11), added
by 56 STAT. 812 (1942), now IDmt. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 109) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331 (1940) (partially incorporated in INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 671-78) ; United
States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938) (overruled by Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (9),
added by 56 STAT. 811 (1942), now INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 108) ; Helvering v. Bashford,
302 U.S. 454 (1937) ; Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) (overruled by INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, 8 368); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (changed by INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 305); General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935)
(incorporated in IimT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 311).
119. INT. Rmv. CODE OF 1954, § 337.
120. President Eisenhower's Budget Message, Jan. 21, 1954. 100 CONG. REc. 540
(1954).
121. I think that the Congress tried to do too much too quickly in the 1954 Code. The
resulting legislation is so complicated that the experts in the Treasury have had a difficult
time assembling regulations covering parts of the Code. The Hegelian product of this
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The Court Holding and Cumberland cases edge into the controversial field
of tax avoidance. One of the principal devices of the thirties and later years
for the minimization of family tax liability was the family partnership. 22 It is
customary for taxpayers to rely in tax avoidance cases upon the shopworn
principle that they have a "legal right" to avoid taxes by means which the law
permits. 12 3 But tax avoidance is one part of tax law that has brought home to
many taxpayers the grim lesson that general abstract propositions do not decide
particular cases. This was the first lesson to be learned from two of Justice
Black's opinions dealing with family partnerships-the Tower 124 and Lust-
haus 125 cases. The next decision, in the Culbertson case, 1 26 should have taught
the Treasury the equally important lesson that it is dangerous to overplay vic-
tory, for the Treasury was less successful in its second round in the Supreme
Court on the family partnership problem.
The Tower and Lusthaus cases involved a family partnership device that
created "an acute problem" for the tax collector in the late thirties and the
forties. 127 The facts of the Tower case sufficiently illustrate the conventional
pattern of the device. For nearly thirty years the taxpayer had done a manu-
facturing business in Michigan. From 1933 to 1937 the business was operated
as a corporation. The taxpayer was president of the corporation and owned
almost all of the outstanding shares of stock; his wife was vice president and
owned a few shares. The wife was on the board of three directors, along with
her husband and a bookkeeper who also owned a few shares. The husband
managed the corporate affairs; the wife performed no business services.
In 1937, when substantial profits pointed to increased taxes, the taxpayer's
attorney and his tax accountant advised him that the dissolution of the cor-
poration and the formation of a partnership would save taxes and eliminate
the necessity of filing corporate returns. Acting upon this advice, the taxpayer
transferred a block of stock to his wife on condition that she place the corporate
assets represented by the transferred shares in a new partnership. This she
did three days after the stock transfer. The husband paid a small gift tax on
the transfer of the shares to the wife. The wife became a limited partner in the
new partnership. A certificate of partnership was filed as required by Michigan
law. The formation of the partnership did not in any way alter the conduct of
fabulous burst of legislative energy brings to mind Judge Learned Hand's famous protest
aaiwnt the passionate rationality of tax statutes. The 1954 Code is truly a "monster."
Its words, it is true, are "strung together with syntactical correctness"; its meaning is
another matter. The process of its interpretation will certainly require "the most inordinate
:.ipcnditure of time" on the part of taxpayers, tax experts, administrative authorities, and the
courts. See Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
122. See Paul, Partnerships in Tax Avoidance, 13 GEO. WASH. L. RE V. 121 (1945).
123. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) ; United States v. Isham, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 496 (1873).
124. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
125. Commissioner v. Lusthaus, 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
126. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
127. See Paul, Partnerships in Tax Avoidance, 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 121 (1945).
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the business :128 the husband continued to have the controlling voice as to pur-
chases, sales, salaries, the time of distribution of income, and all other essentials.
The wife used her drawings from the partnership to buy "what a husband
usually buys for his wife such as clothes and things for the family or to carry
on activities ordinarily of interest to the family as a group.' 1 29
In Justice Black's majority opinion these facts were sufficient to support the
Tax Court's finding that for tax purposes the wife was not a partner in the
business. The validity of the partnership under Michigan law did not make it
"a real partnership" under federal tax law. "The simple expedient of drawing
up papers" was not enough to divide "single tax earnings" into "two tax units"
for purposes of a tax law that looks to command of the taxpayer over income
and seeks to tax income to the person who earns it.130 The creation of the
partnership did not change the economic relation of the husband and wife to
the income of the business. After the creation of the partnership, as before, the
husband managed and controlled the business; neither before nor after did the
wife contribute services or take part in the management. After the creation of
the partnership the wife used the income attributed to her only for the purpose
of buying thh type of things she had bought for herself, the home and the family
before the partnership was formed. "Consequently the result of the partner-
ship was a mere paper reallocation of income among the family members," and
there was more than ample evidence to support the Tax Court's finding that
no genuine union for partnership business purposes was ever intended, and
that the husband earned the income. 3'
The Court did not reject the principle that taxpayers have a right to avoid
taxes by legal means. That principle would apply, Justice Black's majority
opinion stated, in "a situation where a member of a partnership, in order to
keep from paying future taxes on partnership profits and in order to get into
a lower income tax bracket sells his interest to a stranger, relinquishing all
control of the business.' 1 2 The principle did not apply where the taxpayer
"draws a paper purporting to sell his partnership interest even to a
stranger, though actually he continues to control the business to the ex-
tent he had before the 'sale' and channels the income to his wife. Then a
showing that the arrangement was made for the express purpose of reduc-
ing taxes simply lends further support to the inference that the husband
still controls the income from his partnership interest, that no partnership
really exists, and that the earnings are really his and are therefore taxable
to him and not to his wife. The arrangement we are here considering was
of the type where proof of a motive to reduce income taxes simply lent
further strength to the inference drawn by the Tax Court that the wife
128. But "both Amidon [the secretary] and Tower ceased to draw salaries." Commis-
sioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946).
129. Id. at 286.
130. Id. at 291.
131. Id. at 292.
132. Id. at 288-89.
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was not really a partner.... To rule otherwise would mean ordering the
Tax Court to shut its eyes to the realities of tax avoidance schemes."' 133
In the Culbertson case 134 Chief Justice Vinson made a courageous, but un-
successful, effort to clarify a difficult subject which Justice Black's opinions in
the Tower and Litsthaus 135 cases had left in considerable obscurity. Culbert-
son for many years had operated a cattle business in partnership with a man
named Coon. Coon, who was seventy-nine years old in 1939, wished to dissolve
the partnership because of ill-health. The greater part of the partnership herd
was sold, but Culbertson wished to keep about 1,500 Herefords, the brood or
foundation herd. He offered to buy these cattle, and Coon agreed on condition
that Culbertson would sell an undivided one-half interest in the herd to Cul-
bertson's four sons at the same price. Coon's reasons for exacting this con-
dition were his interest in maintaining the Hereford strain, his conviction that
Culbertson was too old to carry on the work alone, and his personal interest in
the Culbertson boys. The boys paid for their interests largely with notes and
partly with the proceeds of a gift from Culbertson. The old partnership was
dissolved. A new oral partnership continued the business.
The four Culbertson boys were young when the new partnership began busi-
ness. The oldest boy, twenty-four years old, was married and lived on the
ranch. A college graduate, he had been foreman for two years under the old
partnership. He received $100 a month plus board and lodging for himself and
his wife, both before and after the new partnership was organized, and until he
entered the Army. The second boy was twenty-two years old and married. He
finished college during the first year of the new partnership, and then went
directly into the Army following graduation and rendered no services for the
partnership. The two younger sons were eighteen and sixteen years old, re-
spectively. They went to school during the winter and worked on the ranch
during the summer.
The principal factual difference between the Tower and Lusthaus cases on
the one hand and the Culbertson case on the other was that a tax avoidance
motive reared its ugly head in the former cases and seems to have been absent
from the latter. 136 Perhaps this is the "inarticulate major premise" of any re-
treat which may have been made by the Court in the later case. 3 7 It must be
133. Id. at 289.
134. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
135. In the Lusthaus case the taxpayer owned and operated a retail furniture business
with two stores. His wife helped in the stores when needed without compensation. In
order to reduce taxes, taxpayer sold a half interest in the business to his wife and executed
a partnership agreement. The wife continued to help out when needed but the taxpayer
retained full control of the business. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding by the Tax Court that there was no genuine partnership.
136. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 738 (1949).
137. This premise was, however, disclaimed by the Chief Justice in his majority opinion
in the Culbertson case. Ibid. And he and Justice Reed had dissented in the Tower and
Lusthaus cases.
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admitted in any event that the total interpretation furnished by the three cases
left something to be desired which has not yet been supplied. Justice Black's
earlier opinions seemed to some lawyers and judges to make the tax validity
of a family partnership depend upon either the contribution of original (not
donated) capital or the performance of services by the wife. But in the Cu!-
bertson case the Court said that the use of these tests by the Tax Court was
"at best, an error in emphasis."1 38 The test is rather whether the partnership
is "real," whether "the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose
intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."' 39 Thus the
Court seemed to establish an "intention" test, making the validity of a family
partnership depend upon subjective considerations. 140
Congress with some justification thought that the Tower, Lusthaus and Cu!-
bertson cases had produced "confusion.' 41 Whether its remedy is worse than
the disease remains to be seen. In any event, in the 1951 Act it amended the
Code to wipe out the "intention" criterion set up by the Culbertson opinion
and the factual standards set up by the Tower and Lusthaus opinions.1"2 Under
the new provisions, which have been incorporated in the 1954 Code, 143 a part-
nership capital interest will be recognized even though it was acquired by pur-
chase or gift from any other person, including a member of the family. Where
a capital interest has been acquired by gift, the distributable share of the donee
partner under the partnership agreement must be included in the donee's gross
income "except to the extent that such share is determined without allowance
of reasonable compensation for services rendered to the partnership by the
donor, and except to the extent that the portion of such share attributable to
the donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the donor at-
tributable to the donor's capital.' 44 The distributive share of a partner in the
earnings of a partnership cannot be diminished because of absence due to mili-
tary service.
This legislative solution can hardly be regarded as ideal. Since the adoption
of income-splitting for husband and wife in 1948, the problem has narrowed
to one involving child partners, or partnerships with trustee members. 14 1 A
partnership consisting of a father and a business acquaintance trustee for a
minor son has been recognized. 146 A trust of which a father-partner is trustee
138. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 741 (1949). Or, less politely, "an
erroneous reading of the Tower opinion." Id. at 745.
139. Id. at 742.
140. See Comment, Family Partnerships and the Revenue Act of 1951, 61 YALE L.J.
541 (1952). See also Lifton, The Family Partnership: Here We Go Again, 7 TAX L. REv.
461 (1952); Schulman, Current Tests for Valid Family Partnership Arrangements, 31
TAxEs 447 (1953).
141. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1951).
142. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3797(a) (2), as amended, 65 STAT. 511 (1951).
143. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 704(e), 7701 (a) (2).
144. Id., § 704 (e) (2). 1
145. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 51(b), as amended, 62 STAT. 115 (1943) (now 1M.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013). See PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATEs 482-83 (1954).
146. Louis R. Eisenmann, 17 T.C. 1426 (1952).
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may be a limited partner ;147 so may a third party trustee for a minor son of
the settlor-partner. 148 But it has also been held that there is no valid partner-
ship for tax purposes where the partner-trustee for a minor son was first a
physician who had nothing to offer the business and later one of the other
partners. 1 4 On the other hand, two men who placed their partnership interests
in trust for a mother and wife respectively, and then ran the business as trus-
tees, have been treated as partners. 150
These attempted solutions in particular cases of the complex problem of
family partnerships have in them a sardonic humor which suggests that subtle-
ties have not been completely eliminated from the tax scene. Humor of a lighter
character may also be admitted to the premises. In their income tax casebook
Surrey and Warren tell of one case in which partnership agreements were pre-
pared with the name of the new partner left blank "awaiting his expected birth
so that sex and name could then be supplied."'' They also call attention to the
case of Redd v. Conmmissioner,1 52 involving as partners a husband, a wife, and
four children aged seven, five and two years, and three months, respectively.
On the trial of this case the partner's wife testified as follows:
"Q. Now, do you participate in the management of the business of the
LaSalle Livestock Company?
"A. Well, I have been producing partners.
"Q. Beg pardon.
"A. I have been too busy producing partners, so far."'153
Similarly, tax lawyers are still busy producing family partnerships with infant
members.
It might have been better if the Courts and Congress had adopted a Clif-
ford 1,4 approach to this elusive problem. In his Tower opinion Justice Black
did mention the Clifford case for the point that the purpose of the tax statute
to tax all income to the person who controlled its distribution could not be
frustrated by family group arrangements, even though the arrangements were
valid for state law purposes; and for the point that "transactions between hus-
band and wife calculated to reduce family taxes should always be subjected to
special scrutiny."' 55 And in the Culbertson case Chief Justice Vinson cited the
147. Theodore D. Stern, 15 T.C. 521 (1950).
148. Edward D. Sultan, 18 T.C. 715 (1952).
149. Feldman v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1950).
150. Stanton v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1951).
151. SuRRE" & W AmusN, FEAL INcOmE TAXATION 846 (1954 ed.).
152. 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 528 (1946), cited in SuRREY & WARREN, op. cit. mipra note
151, at 846.
153. Ibid.
154. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). See Edward D. Sultan, 18 T.C. 715,
724-25 (1952).
155. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946). In his dissent in the Lusthaus
case Justice Reed distinguished the Clifford case as involving a short term trust rather
than a partnership interest which not only was permanently to be the property of the wife,
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Clifford case for the point that income "must be taxed to him who earns it.' u 5
But he also stated that the "Clifford-Horst" principle does not follow "auto-
matically upon a gift to a member of one's family, followed by its investment
in the family partnership.' 5 7 The Senate Report on the 1951 Act refers to
cases "where the transferor retains so many of the incidents of ownership that
he will continue to be recognized as a substantial owner of the interest which
he purports to have given away. . . ."158 This quotation suggests an approach
to the problem to which the courts may have insufficiently resorted. What can be
done to trusts can certainly be done to partnerships. It has not been done so
far.
THE USE OF FEDERAL TAX STATUTES TO ENFORCE LOCAL LAW
No discussion of Justice Black's attitude toward federal taxation would be
complete without some reference to his vigorous dissent in Rutkin v. United
States.';9 In this case a slim majority of the Supreme Court, despite its pre-
vious Wilcox decision 160 that embezzled funds do not constitute income, gave
its blessing to the use of the federal income tax to punish the local crime of
extortion. Justice Black protested that the federal government would never
collect substantial amounts of money from extortioners, and that the purpose
of the policy implicit in the prosecution of Rutkin was "to give Washington
more and more power to punish purely local crimes."' 61 The majority decision,
he thought, authorized "an expansion of Federal criminal jurisdiction into fields
of law enforcement heretofore wholly left to states and local communities.' 0 2
The dissenting opinion of Justice Black went on to indicate the dangers of
such a policy. Taking over enforcement of local criminal laws lowers "the
prestige of the federal system of justice," and makes that system "top-heavy."
"[T]he United States cannot perform the monumental tasks which lie beyond
but exposed her to partnership liability. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293, 303
(1946). See opinion of Arundell, J., in Edward D. Sultan, 18 T.C. 715, 724 (1952); id. at
725 (Opper, J., dissenting opinion).
156. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40, 745, 746, 748 (1949).
157. Id. at 746.
158. S. RE'. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1951). See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 541,
548 (1952).
159. 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952). See also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States
v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 37 (1953).
160. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
161. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 141 (1952).
162. Ibid. Similarly, Justice Black protested in McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S.
57 (1944), where the Court decided that campaign expenses of a judge were not an allow-
able deduction. The protest was against an oblique attack on abuses in campaign expendi-
tures "by strained statutory construction which permits a discriminatory penalty to be
imposed on taxpayers who work for the states, counties, municipalities, or the federal
government." The problem "should be attacked squarely by the proper state and federal
authorities .. " Id. at 71 (dissenting opinion). See also, "The Effectiveness of Present
Federal Tax Statutes and Their Administration," address by Representative Cecil R. King,
American Bar Association, Sept. 16, 1952.
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state power if the time, energy and funds of federal institutions are expended
in the field of state criminal law enforcement.' ' 3
justice Black, along with the three other dissenting Justices in the Rutkin
case. was also concerned about the states. Local crimes-extortion, robbery
and embezzlement, for example-are matters of local concern. The precise
elements of these crimes, as well as the problems underlying them, vary from
state to state. As former United States Attorney General Mitchell once pointed
out, federal enforcement of local laws must of necessity tend to free the states
from a sense of responsibility for their own local conditions. 0 4 And, Justice
Black added,
"Even when states attempt to play their traditional role in the field of law
enforcement, the overriding federal authority forces them to surrender
control over the manner and policy of construing and applying their own
laws.16' 5 State courts not only lose control over the interpretation of their
own laws, but also are deprived of the chance to use the discretion vested
in them by state legislatures to impose sentences in accordance with local
ideas. Moreover, state prosecators are deprived of the all-important func-
tion of deciding what local offenders should be prosecuted. Final authority
to make these important decisions becomes located in the distant city of
Washington, D.C. Here, as elsewhere, too many cooks may spoil the
broth."16'
The undue expansion of federal jurisdiction entails one more complicating
factor. "Criminal rules of substance and of procedure vary widely among the
jurisdictions. Punishment is frequently different. In fact, the same kind of
conduct may be ignored as not worth criminal punishment by one jurisdiction
while considered a serious criminal offense by another.' 06 7
Justice Black's dissenting opinion in the Rutkin case also cited figures that
showed in striking fashion that the federal government was using the federal
tax statute to suppress local crime rather than to collect taxes-so that "it can
hardly be said that Rutkin was tried for tax evasion."'0 8 A total of only thirteen
pages in a voluminous record of 900 pages had any reference to taxes. The re-
163. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1952). "The Bureau as an
agency primarily devoted to the problems of general revenue raising is ill-adapted to take
on the duties of conducting a criminal investigation job outside the tax field." King, supra
note 162, at 5.
164. 72 CoNG. REc. 6214 (1930).
165. In this connection Justice Black mentioned the necessity of determining "how
much law of what state applies." He then suggested that this procedure denies an oppor-
tunity to obtain an authoritative decision on a matter of state law from the highest state
court, thus introducing the problems involved in Erie v. Tompkins. Rutkin v. United States,
343 U.S. 130, 144 n.5 (1952).
166. Id. at 142-43.
167. Id. at 144. Justice Black mentioned the example that under the Federal White
Slave Law men can be imprisoned five years for conduct which many states would not
regard as criminal at all. Ibid. He might have added the point that gambling-a forbidden
activity in many states-is a legitimate activity in Nevada.
16S. Id. at 145.
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maining 887 pages were devoted to inflammatory aspects of Rutkin's past life
and associations, including his bootlegging activities in Prohibition days and
various charges of swindling made by Rutkin and others against one Reinfeld.
Subsequent events have certainly proved the truth of justice Black's suggestion
that "if we are going to depart from the Wilcox holding," the Rutkin case was
"a poor case in which to do so."l 9
The question discussed by Justice Black in this opinion remains important
in connection with various attempts of the Internal Revenue Service to enforce
federal and local public policy. From time to time the Commissioner and the
Department of Justice 170 have seemed to proceed on the theory that the In-
ternal Revenue Code was more an essay on morality, designed and enacted to
encourage virtue and discourage sin, than an attempt to raise revenue to defray
the cost of government. 1 71 Justice Black has sufficiently indicated his lack of
sympathy with an extraneous use of a taxing statute to implement the public
policy of the federal and state governments beyond the area of taxation.1 7 2 Taxes
can be, and should be, a powerful instrument of economic and social policy.17 3
But, as the Supreme Court pointed out in its Wilcox opinion, "moral turpitude
is not a touchstone of taxability."'17 4 If they are dedicated to the purpose of
improving men's hearts,175 tax laws should give plain notice of their com-
mands. 176 "A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application" violates "the first essential of due
process of law.' 1 77 It likewise violates a first principle of sound tax policy, for
the Commissioner is hardly an expert on morality or on the meaning of the
169. Id. at 147. See United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Rutkin v.
Reinfeld, 122 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
170. See "Freedom Under Law," Address by Attorney General Brownell, American
Bar Association Convention, Aug. 27, 1953.
171. Or, as Member Sternhagen said in a dissenting opinion many years ago, "The
revenue act was not contrived as an arm of the law to enforce State criminal statutes by
augmenting the punishment which the State inflicts." Burroughs Bldg. Material Co., 18
B.T.A. 101, 105, aff'd, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
172. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) ; cf. Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90 (1952) ; Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (lst Cir. 1953) ; National
Brass Works v. Commissioner, 182 F2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Jerry Rossman Corp. v.
Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949); Heininger v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 567,
570 (7th Cir. 1943).
173. See BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PRocEss 409, 463 (1952) ; PAIUL, TAXATION
FOR PROSPERITY 201 (1947) ; cf. Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Comnnissioner in
Disallowing Deductions, in MAJOR TAX PROnLEMS Or 1954, U. So. CALIF. TAX INST. 715.
174. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
175. Cf. Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (lst Cir. 1953).
176. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935).
177. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1.926). See also Douglas, J.,
dissenting in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 628 (1954); cf. Conmissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), holding that "payments ...extracted
from ...wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful conduct" retain their character as
"taxable income to the recipients."
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statutes and public policies of forty-eight states and the many nontax statutes
passed by Congress.
Taxpayers are entitled to know, at least with a fair degree of certainty, the
basis of claims against them. 7 8 Certainty is not altogether attainable; we can-
not make tax statutes as plain as the Ten Commandments.Y But the Com-
missioner can take the statute as he finds it, leaving to other authorities the job
of specifying sanctions for the enforcement of statutes having nothing to do
with taxes. For, in the incisive words of an English jurist, public policy is "a
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it, you never know where it
will carry you."'8s0 It sometimes carries the Treasury further than it wants to
go, and taxpayers to a point of financial ruin on account of transactions involv-
ing less than clearly proved technical guilt, and at most mere technical guilt,
but no moral turpitude whatever.
CONCLUSION
The measure of any man in public life, not excluding a Justice of the Su-
preme Court, must be in terms of the problems presented by the times in which
he serves. The Supreme Court is not an ivory tower. It is true that its Justices
are insulated from political activity. But they occupy key positions near the
center of the country's national life. They are on a big stage Their audience
is a large one, and sometimes, properly, a highly critical one.181 They must
178. General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935). See also
Thomas B. Lilly, 14 T.C. 1066, 1088 (1950) (Arundell, J., dissenting opinion).
179. See J. N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 325 (1930); PAUL, TAXATION
FOR PROSPERITY 410 (1947).
180. Burroughs, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303
(C.P. 1824).
181. As Holmes once said, "one may criticize even what one reveres." HOLmES, COL-
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 194 (1952). To quote another, possibly less eminent Justice of
the Court:
"It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or helped
by being spoken of as beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and character
of its justices should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments
subject to the freest criticism. The time is past in the history of the world when any
living man or body of men can be set on a pedestal and decorated with a halo. True,
many criticisms may be, like their authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts
of criticisms than no criticism at all. The moving waters are full of life and health;
only in the still waters is stagnation and death.
"I remember seeing in an eastern paper immediately after the decision in the
well known income tax case a most extravagant eulogy upon the Supreme Court
as a great defender of the rights of the few States against the many and of the
accumulation of property against unconstitutional assaults. And when thereafter
by that Court the act of Congress denouncing all contracts, combinations and con-
spiracies in a restraint of trade was held applicable to a combination between rail-
roads to prevent competition in rates, that same paper contained an article expressing
the most extraordinary surprise that men supposed to be of ordinary intelligence
could be guilty of such a stupid blunder.
"The one article could be condensed in a single clause, 'a Daniel come to judgment;
yea, a Daniel,' and the other in the equally short and expressive phrase, 'An ass within
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supply their own script. In the sense that they can deal only with cases and
controversies presented to the Court their range of effective action is a limited
one; even in the decision of those cases the writer of a majority opinion may
have but a narrow scope to express his ideas.1 82 But most controversial issues
usually manage to find their way to the Court, and this means that each Justice
must take a position on one side or the other of these issues. And in another
sense the Justices have almost boundless freedom in dealing with the questions
which reach them. The answers to many of these questions, which affect
170,000,000 people for better or for worse, cannot be found among reported
precedents. Nor can strict logic supply solutions to the complex riddles in-
volved in the imponderable problems of modern law in America. Answers
must come from a deeper source. They must depend in the last analysis upon
the feelings and intuitions and theories and sense of policy of the individual
Justices on the Court. Their collective will must be done on a large part of the
earth, for the Court is a court of last resort.
This means that the Court has a grave and delicate responsibility. The re-
sponsibility may be greatest in the field of constitutional law where the process
of constitutional amendment is long and slow.' 83 If we would keep the Con-
stitution in harmony with the activities of modern America, and the power of
government "unrestrained by the social or economic theories one set of judges
may entertain," the Constitution must not be an "ark of the covenant, too
sacred to be touched."'' 8 It is therefore important that the Supreme Court be
ever ready to re-examine its own doctrines. "Stare decisis embodies an im-
portant social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is
rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations."'u85 "It is a
strong tie which the future has to the past."'u 6 But it is a principle of policy,
and not a mechanical formula to be followed even in response to pleas to let
Congress correct mistakes that the Court has made. For "legislative correction
of judicial errors is often difficult to effect.'187
The responsibilities of the Supreme Court have been especially heavy dur-
ing Black's incumbency. He came to the Court at an anxious time. The dis-
turbance then enveloping the Court was part of a crisis facing the whole coun-
try. Urgency has changed its character since 1937, but it has not abated. The
problems of depression have become problems of prosperity. It is not a serene
a lion's skin.' Now, it is the inalienable right of every American citizen according
to the peculiar construction of his organs of hearing to recognize in the judgments
of that Court either the voice of a Daniel or the braying of an ass."
Brewer, Government by Injutwtion, 15 NAT'L CoRP. REP. 848, 849 (1898).
182. See text at note 68 supra.
183. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 754 (1949).
184. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kerchival, July 12, 1816, quoted in
Douglas, supra note 183, at 754.
185. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1939).
186. Douglas, supra note 183, at 736.
187. Id. at 746-47.
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prosperity, but rather a nervous prosperity which feeds on war and rumors of
war. And the problems that have been solved are few compared to the many
that remain to be solved. This is especially true in the field of taxation, where
the work of the Court involves the interpretation of some of the most complex
statutes enacted by Congress. Words being what they are-or the little they
are-it is not an easy task to discover the policy of these statutes. The statutes
deal with an intensely important, but difficult, subject.'8 8 They are too often
hastily drafted. But they represent an attempt to deal with problems intimately
associated with the development of the economy and with the welfare of the
whole social fabric.
Against this background I venture to suggest that Justice Black has served
the Court well in matters of taxation. It cannot be said that his most important
work has been in tax territory, but it can be said that what he has done in that
area has been highly useful. It has been in the same pattern as his other work.
Evidently believing that confidence based upon understanding is more endur-
ing than confidence based upon awe, 8 9 he has advocated full disclosure when
a precedent was being overruled. He has been willing to correct judicial error
even where correction might be effected by legislation. In the tricky area of
tax avoidance, where questions of degree abound,190 his attitude has been a
balanced one. He has been unwilling to sanction tax avoidance schemes and
contrivances that lacked reality, but he has not tried to be the keeper of the
congressional conscience. He has bowed his head in obedience to legislative
mandate where Congress has drawn a line and the taxpayer has been on the
safe side of that line. He has respected the principle that different tax con-
sequences may flow from different methods of accomplishing the same ultimate
economic result, and that taxpayers are entitled to select the method that re-
sults in the lower liability.191 And finally, though he has been called a "social
reformer,"'1 2 the Justice has resisted the great temptation to which some judges
succumb in tax cases. Knowing that the federal tax statute is a federal statute,
and that its use to suppress state and local crime involves grave dangers for
our system of government, he has protested against the use of a federal tax
statute, directed to the raising of revenue and to the economic welfare of the
nation as a whole, for the improvement of men's hearts and the accomplish-
ment of moral reform.' 93 Many will hope that his dissent in the Rutkin case
will be an effective appeal to the better intelligence of a future day.'0 4
A virtually unanimous public opinion sustains the proposition that Hugo
Black has responded with distinction to the needs of the times which brought
him to the Supreme Court. His federal tax opinions have maintained the
188. See Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
189. Cf. id. at 754.
190. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161
(1925).
191. See Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 RocKY Mr. L. REv. 412 (1953).
192. Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68'HARv. L. REv. 940, 997 (1955).
193. See PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 698 (1954).
194. See text at note 63 supra.
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standards of his other work on the Court. Those are high standards, indeed.
But no standards can be too high, for tax law is a dynamic and exacting sub-
ject. The solution of the problems it presents to the Court in days to come will
call for the most meticulous attention to legal detail and a highly developed
sense of policy. justice Black has demonstrated that he has the qualities the
Court needs in its tax work. His long experience should help the Court greatly
as it goes forward with the task of guiding lower courts in their important
work of interpreting tax statutes in the light of the needs of a nation faced with
the fiscal, as well as many other, necessities of leadership in a disorganized and
troubled world.
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The special nature of this issue calls for a special word of explanation. The
idea of a Festschrift to celebrate Justice Black's seventieth birthday was put
forward a year ago by Professor Cahn, and was promptly and delightedly
seized upon by the editors of the Journal. We asked the Justice for his per-
mission, but he declined to assert any right of consent or objection. "Judges
and their work are in a way a part of the public domain subject to public dis-
cussion," he wrote, "and law journals are peculiarly suited to carry on such
discussions .... I think law journals can do their job best if they can perform
their functions with the same independence judges do."
With this independence, we sought to assemble a group of contributors at
once eminent and close to the Justice; and from them to secure not a compre-
hensive, symposium-style evaluation of Justice Black's work but a collection
of pieces touching on aspects of either his work or his interests. Such are the
leading articles in this issue; and such are the authors listed below.
The list is smaller by two names than we had hoped. Not every subject
we should have liked to deal with has been included here-we were unable to
secure an appropriate piece on admiralty, the subject that, more than any
other, Justice Black has made uniquely his own province on the Court. And
not every author whom we should have liked to include, and who wished to
be included, was able to join us. Judge Jerome Frank, overtaken by an un-
seasonal surge of work on the Second Circuit, was forced to postpone to a
later issue a piece he had promised for the Festschrift.
The final note is a sorrowful one. Mr. Randolph Paul, after he had made
his substantial contribution to the project, was suddenly taken from us. Some
sense of the magnitude of the loss is, we hope, conveyed on page 495: some
sense of the distinction of the man is to be found below.
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